In this paper, I present a comprehensive engagement with Jonathan Wolff’s nuanced conception of the state and political obligations. Wolff argues that if the state is to be justified, it must be shown that there are universal political obligations. Wolff acknowledges that while the theory of consent succeeds in part, it ultimately leads to what he calls a two-stage justification thesis: first, we must ascertain that a significant majority of the population do consent to the state; second, we must prove that those who do not consent still have political obligations. According to Wolff, no voluntarist theory can adequately satisfy this second stage. The utilitarian solution, Wolff argues, also fails because it permits enormous injustices and is susceptible to the ‘scapegoat’ objection. Thus, Wolff concludes that no single theory can satisfactorily resolve the problem of political obligation.
Wolff, therefore, endorses a form of moral pluralism as a framework for addressing the problem of political obligations, and thus proposes a three-way scheme: first, rational justification grounded in self-interest; second, reciprocity based on fair exchange; and third, reasonableness, which concerns justice. Consequently, Wolff argues that while most people’s obligations would be based on one or more of the three moral schemes, a relatively small number of people would escape political obligations altogether. Nevertheless, those who escape political obligation would, in principle, still have moral duties of justice, even if the state lacks the practical authority to enforce them.
This paper is structured in three parts. In the first part, I give a careful explication of Wolff’s thesis and arguments. In the second part, I identify some of the successful aspects of Wolff’s three-way model. In the third part, I offer two objections to Wolff’s thesis: first, the insurmountability of universality, and second, incompatibility of the presumed moral duty of those who escape political obligations and their natural liberty. I conclude that Wolff’s three-way model is insufficient to dispel some anarchist commitments to natural liberty, and as such, the problem of justifying the state remains unresolved.