Alasdair MacIntyre (no relation) is best known for his critique of modern rationalist moral philosophy and his attempted resuscitation of the Aristotelian tradition of virtue ethics. Of course, he is not alone in promoting a revitalization of Aristotle (and St. Thomas Aquinas), but he has offered the most well-known critique of the shallowness and ultimate vacuity of the two most prevalent forms of modern moral philosophy, utilitarianism and deontology. I propose to offer a sympathetic account of his critique of modern moral rationalism, while also suggesting that his critique owes as much to other modern critics of moral rationalism, like Hegel and Collingwood, as it does to Aristotle and Aquinas. I will also suggest that the primary weakness of MacIntyre’s version of virtue ethics is that it does not adequately answer the challenges posed by modern moral pluralism to a unified conception of the human telos. I will focus the essay, for the most part, on After Virtue, but will also address A Short History of Ethics, Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, and Three Rival Versions of Moral Inquiry.